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Microeconomics, including the study of individual choice and of group
choice in market and nonmarket processes, has generally been considered a
field science as distinct from an experimental science. Hence microeconomics
has sometimes been classified as "nonexperimental" and closer methodologi-
cally to meteorology and astronomy than to physics and experimental
psychology (Marschak, 1950, p. 3; Samuelson, 1973, p. 7). But the question
of using experimental or nonexperimental techniques is largely a matter of
cost, and generally the cost of conducting the most ambitious and informative
experiments in astronomy, meteorology, and economics varies from prohib-
itive down to considerable. The cost of experimenting with different solar
system planetary arrangements, different atmospheric conditions, and dif-
ferent national unemployment rates, each under suitable controls, must be
regarded as prohibitive. On a more feasible scale, cloud-seeding experiments,
JupiterSaturn scientific space probes, and field experiments in negative
income taxes and education vouchers, while costly, are not prohibitive. But
these more grandiose experiments are of recent occurrence, and basic scien-
tific development in the cases of astronomy and meteorology has depended
upon small-scale laboratory experiments in the physics of mass motion,
thermodynamics, and nuclear reactions.
In this paper we try to develop a foundation for the study of resource
allocation mechanisms entirely in terms of propositions that are testable, and
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ISBN 0-12-416550-8tested, by means of controlled laboratory experiments. The question implicit
throughout the paper is What can we, and dowe, know with high credibility
about allocative mechanisms? The statement "high credibility"means that
the propositions have been tested under controls thatcan be evaluated and
scrutinized, and the results replicated, by other researchers. Specifically,we
can reject the hypothesis that the researcher and his subjects are themselves
a significant treatment variable and become as sure as we please of the pro-
positions by repeated replication. Although the measurement and verification
of hypotheses about individual behavior, e.g., SlutskyHicks demand theory
(Battalio et al., 1973), are of coequal importance in experimental economics,
the discussion here will be limited to experimental studies of resource allo-
cation mechanisms.
2. Some Preceptual Foundations
of Experimental Economics
Three precepts are offered to constitute a foundation for theuse of
laboratory experimental methods in testing hypotheses about the behavior
of allocation mechanisms.'
Precept 1:IVonsatiation (Smith, 1976a).Given a costless choice be-
tween two alternatives which differ only in that the first yields more of the
reward medium (e.g., currency) than the second, the first will always be chosen
(preferred) over the second by an autonomous individual, i.e., utility U(M) is
a monotone increasing function of the reward medium.
In credible economics experiments real people must make real decisions
about objects or activities that have real value. Since control is theessence
of experimental methodology, it is critically important that the experi-
menter be able to control or specify individual values to a degree that
allows one to state that as between two experiments individual values either
do or do not differ in a specific way. Precept 1 allows such control to be
achieved by using a reward structure to induce value on the objects traded,
or the actions taken, in a particular experimental setting.
EXAMPLE 1.The simplest example of the application of Precept 1, and
one that is used frequently in market mechanism experiments, is that of in-
ducing a demand for units of an abstract commodity. Let subject buyers,
= 1,2,. .. , n, each be given a function (in graphical or tabular form) listing
increasing concave currency receipts R.(q1) to be provided by the experi-
Also see Fiorina & Plott (1975) and Plott (1978) for further discussion of methodological
aspects of laboratory decision experiments.
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menter for q1 units purchased in an experimental market. Neoclassical de-
mand is defined as the set of alternative quantities that would be purchased
contingent upon corresponding given prices prevailing in the market.
Assuming differentiability, at price p the utility to i of purchasing q, units is
U[R1(q) - pq], which is a maximum for q,> 0 if and only if {R(q1)-p]
U[] = 0 for U concave in q. Since u> o, the ith individual induced
demand is q = Rl)(p). Hence the induced market demand forn individuals
is Q =R'(p).
EXAMPLE 2.Subject agents are each given a function (in graphical or
tabular form) listing quasi-concave total currency receipts, V(y, X) to be
paid to i if i retains y units of a private good and the collective of agents
agrees on the quantity X of a public good. Then i's unknown utility for
money U1() induces the utility U1[V1(y,X)] on any point (y1,X). Induced
on each subject is the experimentally controlled indifference map given by
the level contours of V'(y1,X) = constant, independent of a particular sub-
ject's utility of money. That is, each i's marginal rate of substitution ofy, for
X is given by
dy u;v v
ifU.>0. dX UVV'
It is assumed that V is increasing in y for all i, but V could be increasing
or decreasing in X depending on whether X is a "good" or a "bad" for any
particular agent. The experimenter need not be constrained to impose the
condition that the common outcome variable X be a good for every agent.
It might be supposed that using currency to induce value on abstract
experimental choices is an artificial procedure peculiar to the methodology
of laboratory decision studies. But this interpretation is incorrect. Economic
systems produce countless examples of intangible property on which value
is induced by virtue of the specification of conditions under which the holder
of the intangible item may claim money or goods. All financial instruments
such as shares, bonds, options, futures contracts, and indeed fiat money
itself have value induced upon the instruments by the bundle of rights they
convey. Experimental instructions define the rights of subject agents, and
specify the institutions of decision making in the experiment. In Example 1,
subject buyer i is given the unabridged right to claim R(q) units of money
(less any specified costs) from the experimenter in return for the acquisition
of q units of "commodity" under the trading rules of the exchange institution.
Without such a right a subject need have no more motivation to purchase
the experimental commodity than would an investor who had no claim to
the earnings and assets of Chrysler Corporation as a result of purchasing the
company's stock.348 VERNON L. SMITH
At least three important qualifications to the theory of induced valuation
based upon Precept 1 must be recognized because these qualificationscon-
stitute potential pitfalls to the routine, casual, or mechanical interpretation
of experimental results. These qualifications stem from the adjectives "cost-
less" and "autonomous" in the statement of Precept 1 and will be summarized
in the following precept.
Precept 2:Complexity.In general individual decision makers must
be assumed to have multidimensional values which attach nonmonetary
subjective cost or value to (1) the process of making and executing individual
or group decisions, (2) the end result of such decisions, and (3) the rewards
(and perhaps behavior) of other individuals involved in the decision process.
This precept covers the phenomenon of subjective transaction cost or
the cost of thinking, calculating, and acting (cf. Marschak, 1968), the possible
commodity value of decision outcomes, and interpersonal utilities. Since
the subjects in an economics experiment area sample drawn from the
socioeconomic system, they can be expected to exhibit the behavioral
characteristics of economic agents in that system.
One such characteristic is the attachment of subjective cost (or value) to
the making and execution of market or other social decisions. Inan auction
market experiment a subject may find it arduous to monitor quotations,
make his own quotations, and execute transactions. In a voting experiment
a subject may see the process of agenda discussion, thinking about alter-
natives, and voting as toilsome activities. If such considerations are not
negligible, they may be an important source of uncontrolled individual valua-
tion of actions. Hence the utility function for i becomesU(M, E)whereM
is monetary reward, and E is the "transactional effort" required to obtain this
reward (cf. Leibenstein, 1976, for an analysis of the effect of such nonmonetary
disutilities on traditional microeconomic theory). IfEdepends on the level
of the rewarded activity, such as q in Example 1, then there is some inevitable
loss of control over the value induced on that activity. This is why a very small
transaction commission is usually paid in auction market experiments, and
why one tries to design experiments so that the reward is large relative to the
mechanical complexity of the decision task (see Smith (1976a)). In the strict
sense such nonmonetary utilities or disutilities give rise to a fundamental
"principle of indeterminacy" of induced value,2 although practically, at least
in many laboratory experiments, the problem can be finessed by simple
experimental design procedures.
2 That is,we use a reward medium to induce gross value, but net value is indeterminant
because we do not observe the subjective costs of transaction, decision and calculation thatare
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As with their counterparts in the economy, experimental subjects may
attach subjective "game value" to experimental outcomes. Thus a make-
believe profit R.(q1) - pq1 may have subjective value S[R(q1)- pq]. If S is
monotone increasing, then such gaming utilities create no methodological
problems since they reinforce rather than distort the effect of an explicit
monetary reward structure. Using instructions to induce role-playing be-
havior (i.e., acting as if profits were real) can be useful and informative, but
the results are more likely to be sensitive to particular experimenters, subject
groups, task complexity, and other sources of variability.
Another characteristic of economic agents, and therefore experimental
subjects, is that they may not be autonomous own-reward maximizers. Inter-
personal utility criteria may upset the theory of induced value as contained
in Precept 1 by allowing equity, altruistic, or invidious comparisons to in-
fluence subjective realized value. This distorting interdependence is usually
controlled satisfactorily by the condition of "incomplete information"
(Fouraker & Siegel, 1963) wherein subject monetary rewards are only known
privately during an experiment. Since such rewards are for the purpose of
inducing utility on outcomes, and such utility is not observable in economic
agents, this privacy condition is relevant to capturing "realism" in most
experimental designs.
It is natural and important to inquire as to the relevancy of the results
obtained from laboratory experiments to the behavior of economic agents
in the economic system at large. This leads us to
Precept 3:Parallelism.Propositions about the behavior of individ-
uals and of markets and other resource allocation mechanisms that have
been tested in laboratory environments apply also to nonlaboratory environ-
ments where similar ceteris paribus conditions prevail.
This precept is not unique to social science but has relevance to all
experimental methods.
We apply the term "parallelism" to the proposition suggested by Harlow
Shapley (1964, p. 43) that "as far as we can tell, the same physical laws prevail
everywhere." A science of astronomy or meteorology would scarcely have
been possible without the maintained hypothesis that the physical laws of
mass motion and the thermodynamics of gases, verifiable in small-scale
laboratory experiments, had application to the stars and the climate. Further-
more, since nonexperimental measurements in astronomy and meteorology
have not yet contradicted these physical laws, one has accepted this parallel-
ism as having been confirmed.
This concept has important application to the study of microeconomic
behavior. Two important research implications follow whenever replicable
laboratory behavior has been firmly demonstrated. First, one should seek350 VERNON L. SMITH
those extensions or modifications of existing theory that explain why it
occurs, and second, one should seek field tests of the hypothesis that the
behavior is also manifest in other, ostensibly "richer," environments.3 The
robustness of a behavioral "law" across different environmentscan only be
determined empirically. Theories normally abstract from all those charac-
teristics which lead one to apply the adjective "richer" toa given environment,
and hence represent statements about behavior thatare hypothesized to be
independent of the environment. But this indepencence hypothesismay not
be correct, and by comparing behavior in different environmentsone may
establish a basis for important extensions in theory.
Experiments are sometimes criticized for not being "realistic",i.e.,
parallelism is questioned. There are two appropriateresponses to this criti-
cism : First, if the purpose of the experiment is to testa theory, are the elements
of alleged unrealism in the experiment parameters of the theory? Ifnot, then
the criticism must be directed to the theoryas much as to the experiment.
Laboratory experiments are normally as "rich"as the theories they test.
Second, are there field data to support the criticism, i.e., data suggesting that
there may be differences between laboratory and field behavior. If not, then
the criticism is pure speculation; if so, then it is important to parametrize
the theory to include the behavior in question.
What is important about an experiment is that it be relevant to its
purpose, not that it be realistic in the sense that it be "real-world-like" in some
subjective sense. Indeed, the best experiment is the crucial experiment whose
outcome clearly distinguishes between competing theories. But the condi-
tions of the crucial experiment may rarely, if ever,occur in nature.
For example, one of the crucial experiments of relativity theory is to
determine if stars behind the edge of the sun appear to be displaced from their
known positions during a total solar eclipse (i.e., whetheror not light signals
"bend" in gravitational fields). One does not object to such experimental
observations because solar eclipses are not "realistic," i.e., not commonly ob-
served; rather one marvels at this scientific exploitation ofan unusual event.
Similarly in particle physics, experimentalists synthesize unnaturalcon-
ditions to produce particles predicted by theory but unobservable in the
natural order. Fouraker & Siegel (1963) have studied duopoly and triopoly
price competition under the homogeneous product condition. This is "un-
realistic" in the sense that such perfect oligopoly conditionsare rarely, if ever,
encountered in the field. A major Fouraker and Siegel finding isa strong
See Plott & Levine (1974) for an interesting field experiment in the effect of agendaon
majority rule group decision. Following the field experiment the authors designed similar
laboratory experiments to test the replicability of their field results and tovary the agenda as
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tendency for triopolies and even duopolies to converge to the Bertrand com-
petitive price solution. These results can be interpreted as providing an im-
portant explanation of why one so rarely observes homogenous product
competition among the few. It is unprofitable; hence there are strong incen-
tives for product differentiation. So is the experiment "unrealistic," or does it
provide a relevant explanation of why the conditions of the experiment are
not likely to survive in "nature"? How does one acquire an understanding of
why institutions and their outcomes are as we observe them? I know of no
way other than to experiment with alternative institutions and observe the
consequent outcomes.
3. Dynamic Market Adjustment Hypotheses
Two sets of experiments designed to test hypotheses about the dynamic
adjustment behavior of oral double auction markets are reported in this
section.
3.1. Two EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS WITH GROWING DEMAND
Hess (1972) has studied the effects of period-by-period changes in both
supply and demand in an experimental double auction market. However,
the subjects did not receive cash profit rewards, and as indicated above,
this may affect outcomes in market experiments. The sequence of changed
supply and demand was designed to create and reinforce the expectation
that price rises a fixed amount (10 cents) each period. The effect of this
expectation on the subsequent empirical observations was determined in
each of four different experimental sessions. This price expectation "treat-
ment" was found to bias actual prices away from their theoretical values.
Arrow (1960) and Arrow & Capron (1959) have discussed pricequantity
adjustments in competitive markets with rising demands. Assuming a
linear demand function increasing linearly with time and a linear Walrasian
adjustment process, Arrow proves several propositions briefly paraphrased
as follows:
The shortage (defined as excess demand) increases from the initial
value of 0 toward an asymptotic limit
Prices rise, and the increase approaches a constant rate depending
only on supply and demand conditions.
Actual price is always below the price that would clear the market.
These propositions also hold under the hypothesis of adaptive expectations,
i.e., where the economic agent compares actual price with his previousexpectation of it and then forms a new expectation by revising his previous
expectation in the direction of the actual price.4
Two experiments designed to approximate the conditions of the preceding
propositions are used to test their validity. In each experiment demand
rises linearly with time, where "time" is measured interms of trading periods,
and the experimental supply and demand conditionsare approximately
linear.
Twenty-seven subjects participated in the first experiment and forty-
seven in the second. The instructions were those of the double auction
(Smith, 1964, pp. 199-201 where both buyers and sellersare permitted to
make oral quotations (bids or offers). Each buyer (seller) receiveda 5 cent
commission in addition to the profit from exchange. Profitwas equal to
buyer value or limit price minus purchase price (for sellers,price minus cost).
Experiment 1 consisted of six trading periods. At the end of each of
the first four trading periods the buyers' cardswere collected, and a new
set of buyer limit prices, corresponding to an increase in demand,were
distributed randomly among the buyers. Consequently, the highest limit
buyer in period 1 would not be, except by accident, the highest limit buyer
in period 2. The first five trading periodswere characterized by the five
demand arrays exhibited on the left of Fig. 1. At the end of the fifth trading
period the buyer limit cards were collected, justas in the previous periods,
except that this time the new cards that were distributed correspondedto
a repeat treatment of the period 5 demand condition. Hence the subjects
did not know at any time that the demand had increased in periods2 through
5, nor that it had not increased in the case of period 6. They knew only what
was obviousthat buyers were receiving new limit price cards. Subject
information consisted only of their private limit prices, thesequence of
verbal bids, offers, and contract prices that prevailed in each trading period.
Experiment 2 used approximately thesame supply and demand condi-
tions as in 1, except that seven trading periodswere conducted with the
six demand schedules shown on the left of Fig. 2. The first experimentused
undergraduates at Stanford, the second used public school teachers ina
summer program at Purdue.
The response of contract prices in experiments 1 and2 is graphed on the
right in Figs. 1 and 2. Contract prices tend to be equalto or below the theoreti-
cal equilibrium in the first three periods of each experiment.In experiment
1 (2), only one (three) of the fifteen contracts in periods 1to 3 were above
equilibrium. But in period 5 of experiment 1 onlyone contract is below the
theoretical equilibrium, and in experiment 2, period 6, only three of thirteen
See Arrow (1960, pp. 8-13) for a rigorous derivation of these propositions and their exten-
sion %lsing adaptive (trend) expectations.
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TABLE 1
PRICE-QUANTITY BEHAVIOR WITH GROWING DEMAND
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
contracts are below equilibrium. Proposition 3 fails to be supportedin
period 5 of experiment 1 and period 6 of experiment2. Using a t test on
the contract prices in these two periods,we reject the hypothesis (Pro-
position 3) that the data came from populationswith a mean equal to
$3.00 (t = 2.86) in experiment 1 and equalto $3.125 (t = 2.81) in experiment
2. In each experiment the experience of rising priceseventually produced
expectations that caused sellers to raise their offers (andbuyers to accept)
above the theoretical equilibrium.
Evidence contrary to Proposition 1 is shown in Table 1.The "shortage"
is interpreted, i.e., measured,as initial excess demand prevailing at the mean
contract price. The proposition is violated in period 5 of experiment1 and
periods 4, 5, and 6 of experiment 2.
Also in Table 1 it is seen that themean price rises in successive periods,
but, at least for the limited number of periodsobserved, the increase in
price does not appear to be approachinga constant5 (Proposition 2).
3.2. SPECULATION AND INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM
Samuelson (1957) has providedan extension to intertemporal markets
of the assumption sometimes made for stationarymarkets, that economic
agents have "perfect" knowledge in thesense of foreknowledge of market
supply and demand Experiments suchas those reported in the next sec-
See Carlson (1967) for an experimental test of the cobweb theorem in dynamicmarkets
with a lagged supply response. Carison reportsconvergence in such markets even in the so-called
"unstable" case. Both Carlson's experiments and those reported heresuggest that conventional
















1 2.20 2.20 0 2.175 2.10 2
2 2.40 2.36 .16 1 2.375 2.34 .24 2
3 2.60 2.53 .17 2 2.50 2.40 .06 4
4 2.80 2.73 .20 2 2.725 2.73 .33 0
5 3.00 3.05 .32 -1 2.925 2.90 .17 0
6 3.00 3.125 3.22 .32 -3
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tion make it obvious that such assumptions are notnecessary to yield con-
vergence to competitive equilibria under the oral double auction exchange
mechanism. A recent experimental study (Miller, Plott, & Smith, 1977)
has examined the hypothesis that, under incomplete information, specula-
tion will narrow seasonal price differences significantly below the theoretical
price differences in the absence of speculation. Williams (1977) has replicated
this work and extended it to test the hypothesis that speculation willnarrow
actual, as well as theoretical, seasonal price differences.
In these two studies the intertemporal experimental paradigm isone
in which (unknown to the subjects) demand cycles fromDbin the "blue"
(B) season toDin the "yellow" (Y) season in each period, while the supply
S is stationary from one season to the next. These demand and supplycon-
figurations are shown on the left of Figs. 3 and 4. Again the double oral
auction price mechanism was used in eachseason of trading. Six buyers
each had a capacity to buy two units at specified limit prices thatwere
different in each season. These limit prices defined demandsDbandD
for up to twelve units per season as shown. Six sellers each hada capacity
to sell two units at specified limit (cost) prices which did not differ between
seasons. These limit prices defined the supply S shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
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Fig. 4. [Reprinted from V. L. Smith (Ed.), Research in Experimental Economies, Volume 1,
JAI PRESS INC., 1979.]
Finally, in each experiment two "traders" were given the power to buy any
number of units in a B season. Any units thus purchased could be carried
over (at zero cost) for resale only in the subsequent Y season. Since it was
possible for these traders to make losses they were each given a $3 initial
capital endowment. No subject had any information on market demand or
supply, but all subjects could observe the bids, offers, and contracts as they
occurred.
In Fig. 3 (from Miller et al. 1977), during period 1 two purchases were
made by traders in B, and resold in Y. In periods 2 and.3 traders carried
over three units, and in the subsequent periods they carried over five units.
Effectively, market prices were very near the intertemporal equilibrium by
period 3. The optimal trader carryover was four units, but they consistently
carried over five units in periods 4 to 6. This was because in each of these
periods at least one seller, able to make a profit at these prices, failed to
negotiate a sale before the trading season ended (seasons were timed, 5
minutes in length). In each case either a seller quoted offers too high to be
accepted, or the offer lost to another seller. This reduced effective supply
in the yellow season and permitted the unit of excess demand to be filled
in by a trader carrying over an additional unit.
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Williams (1977) replicated this experiment with different subjects, and
obtained essentially the same results. He also designed and executedan
autarky (i.e., no speculating traders participated) experiment with the
same parameters and procedure. His results are reproduced in Fig. 4. Note
the tendency of contract prices to lag behind the cyclical shifts in demand
which is to be expected in view of the similar "hysteresis" effects in Figs.
1 and 2 for growing demand. But in successive trading periods thegap
between contract prices widens. Comparing Figs. 3 and 4 it is clear that
speculation is a significant treatment variable.
The null hypothesis that the prices observed in the B and Yseasons
of the final trading period came from populations with means equal to the
autarky prices in these seasons is tested with the t statistic
t(n1 +22)=- Pt, - (p' -p)/sJ(1/nj) + (1/fl2).
, is the sample mean of n, prices for i = b, y, and p,is the autarky price
for i = b, y. s2 is the pooled estimate of the population variance for the
combined B and Y seasons. In the Miller, Plott, Smith experiment, t=
59.8, and in the Williams replication t =- 19.5 both significant with
better than a .001 confidence level. Williams (1977) compared his speculation
market and autarky market mean prices giving t= - 10.72. Consequently,
the null hypothesis that "speculation" is an ineffective treatment variable
is still rejected at better than a .001 level of confidence. In this sensewe
know with "high credibility" that speculation is effective in providingan
intertemporal equilibrium.
4. Effect of Information on Price Convergence
in Competitive Markets
One of the most prominent, replicable, empirical properties of the
double auction competitive price mechanism is its rapidconvergence to
the supply and demand equilibrium under the condition of incomplete
information, or privacy, where each agent knows only hisown marginal
valuation or marginal cost function (Smith, 1976b). It might be supposed
that under complete information, where each agent is informed of the
value and cost functions of other agents, marketconvergence would im-
prove, or at minimum not be worse. As briefly reported earlier (Smith,
1976a, p. 278), there is at least one class of crucial experiments for which
this proposition must be rejected, namely the class in which all the exchange
surplus is obtained by the buyers (or sellers) at the equilibrium price. Pre-
cept 2 provides a possible explanation of why this is the case: when agentsPrice
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know each other's payoffs, it provides scope for interpersonal utility con-
siderations to impinge upon behavior.
The supply and demand curves on the left of Figs.5and 6 have the
characteristic that at the equilibrium price the entire exchange surplus
of $1.10 (plus a 5 cent "commission") per transaction is captured by the
buyers. Sellers receive only the5cent commission. In Fig.5the excess
supply for all feasible transaction prices is five units, while for Fig. 6 excess
supply is eight units. The panels in each figure plot successive transaction
prices for independent groups of subjects, i.e., no subject participated in
more than one of the eight experimental sessions. In each figure the (a)
and (b) experiments were conducted under the incomplete information
condition, the (c) experiments applied complete information, and the (d)
experiments applied incomplete information initially for two (or three)
Quantity
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periods, then complete information was provided, and trading resumed for
two additional trading periods. In all experimental sessions except 5(d)
each subject could buy (or sell) one unit per trading period. In 5(d) there
were three sellers, each of whom could sell six units per period, and two
buyers who could buy five and six units respectively per trading period.
Providing "complete information" meant informing all subjects that buyers
each had limit prices $4.20 and sellers $3.10 and thatup to 11 units could
be purchased and up to 16 (19) units sold.
Comparing the results of the (a) and (b) experiments with those of (c),
both Figs. 5 and 6 make it plain that convergence is more pronouncedor
more rapid in the incomplete than in the complete information treatments.
That the differences are attributable to the treatment variable "information"
is reinforced by the "switchover" experiments 5(d) and 6(d). In 5(d) intro-
ducing complete information after two periods of trading leads toa distinct
"jump" in the level of contract prices, and similarly, in experiment 6(d)
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Fig. 6.the level of prices. But in each case the increase in prices is unable to persist
in the final trading period as sellers compete to avoid forgoing sales.
Shubik (1959, pp. 169-170) long ago surveyed and incisively criticized
what various authors have said about the alleged importance of "perfect
knowledge" in driving competitive equilibria. Shubik's main pointwas
that more information increases the likelihood that combinations will
result. Although formal combinations were not allowed in the above ex-
periments, a type of short-lived tacit collusion occurred under complete
information which does indeed retard convergence to competitive equilibria.
5. Sealed-Bid Mechanisms for Private Goods
Sealed-bid auctions are an important and widely employed mechanism
of exchange in construction, land, securities, and many other markets. This
section will report on two previously unpublished experiments with sealed-
bid auctions, summarize some previously published experiments, and relate
these earlier experiments to recent field experiments in the auctioning of new
securites. These latter developments are especially significant in attempting
to evaluate parallelism in bidding behavior as between laboratory and field
environments.
5.1. FIRST, SECOND, AND SELLER PRICE AUCTIONS
When a unique indivisible commodity, such as a piece of land or a con-
tract to build a bridge, is sold by sealed bidding, the rules normally call for
the item to be awarded to the highest bidder at a price equal to the amount
bid. Vickrey (1961) has suggested another rule, namely, that the item be
awarded to the highest bidder at a price equal to the next highest bid. This
rule is incentive compatible, or demand revealing, in that it is optimal for
each bidder to enter a bid equal to his valuation (the maximum price he is
willing to pay) for the item. This is because each buyer's surplus, if he is
awarded the items, is independent of his bid provided that his bid is above
that of the next highest bidder. Any bid below a buyer's actual valuation will
therefore reduce the probability of the award, and be an inferior strategy.
Marschak (see Smith (1979)) had suggested, prior to Vickrey's important
contribution, a mechanism with the same property. Marschak's mechanism
was to ask the seller to write down privately a "bid" for the item and put it
in an envelope. The item is then awarded to the highest bidder provided the
high bid exceeds that of the seller, otherwise the seller retains the item. This
is equivalent to Vickrey's rule, since in effect the seller is being allowed to bid
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for his own item (which, by the way, is not permitted in some auctions).
Marschak's rule has the advantage that it would apply even when there is
only one buyer for the item. These three different mechanisms will be referred
to as the first, second, and seller price auctions.
A pilot experiment was conducted as follows: each of six subjects bid
on each of three auctioned "items," I, II, III, in each of 11 successive auction
periods. The first period was a practice trial, while in each of the next ten
periods the winning bidder on each item was paid the difference between that
person's "resale" valuation price for the item and the price paid in that
auction. Auction I was a first price auction, Auction II used the second price
rule, while Auction III used Marschak's seller price rule. The subjects were
naïve in the sense that they were not given any training or "coaching" on how
one might bid. But ten "money" trials were run following the first trial with
the idea of providing adequate scope for learning. The award rules for each
of the three types of auctions were explained in written instructions, repeated
verbally, and questions were answered. After the bids were collected in each
period, the highest bid was posted on the blackboard for Auction I, the
highest and second highest for Auction II, and the highest bid and the seller's
bid for Auction III. The subjects' private "resale" valuations were chosen so
that the highest value would be between $4 and $9, with the next highest
subject valuation chosen at random among numbers that were $50, $1.00,
and $1.50 below the highest valuation for that auction. The remaining four
valuations were chosen at arbitrary values lower than the second highest
value.
Figure 7 plots by period the valuebid gap (F- B1), i.e., the difference
between the resale value and the bid submitted by each subject for each
auction. The above theory suggests the hypothesis that subjects will tend to
bid so as to yield a higher J' - B. in Auction I than in II or III. Ideally,
according to the theory, subjects would bid their valuations in Auctions II
and III so that V - B, = 0, but we expect real people to perceive this with
differing degrees of error and perhaps exhibit some learning conditioned by
experiences.
From Fig. 7 it will be observed that subjects 2, 3, 4, and 6 either perceived
immediately, or learned within the first several trials, that it was in their
interest to bid B1 =in Auctions II and III. Subject 5 did this in Auction III
but not II. Since subject 5 happened to have the winning bid for Auction II
on three occasions in spite of having bid B5 < V5, no failure was experienced.
Subject 1 is the only case of exceptionally slow learning if indeed it can be
said that there was any learning.
The nonparametric paired-sample sign test was applied to the period-by-
period bids of all subjects comparing Auction I with Auction II bids. The
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Fig. 7.
I is tested against the one-sided alternative that the bids in IIare above those
in I. By this test the null hypothesis is rejected ata level of significance
p < .001. Similarly, comparing Auction I with Auction Ill we reject the null
hypothesis at p < .001.
5.2. SEALED BIDDING FOR MULTIPLE UNITS:
MONOPOLY PRODUCTION
Vickrey (1961) argues that some of the incentive characteristics of the
First and Second Price auctions for a single item generalizeto the case of
multiple units offered for sale. When thereare multiple units the analogue of
the First Price auction has been called the discriminative auction (Smith,
1967) in which all accepted bids are filled at their respective bid prices.The
analogue of the Second Price auction is the competitiveor uniform-price
auction wherein all accepted bidsare filled at the lowest accepted bid price
(Smith, 1967), or strictly, as noted by Vickrey,at the highest rejected bid
price. But unless the offering is quite smallone would not expect lowest
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A pilot experiment was conducted using one subject as a monopoly pro-
ducer and five subjects as buyers. The seller could produce up to twelve units
at zero fixed cost and at marginal cost MC shown on the left of Fig. 8. Buyers
each had marginal valuations for two units such that the five buyers together
provided the demand D shown in Fig. 8. Again the seller did not know the
marginal valuations of any buyer and no buyer knew the valuations of other
buyers nor the marginal cost situation of the seller. The theoretical monopoly
price and quantity is (Pm,Qm) =(S 1.10, 5), while the competitive is(Pa, Qc) =
(5.80,8).
Posted-Bid (Discriminative) Auction Uniform Price Auction
CONTRACT AT INDICATED PRICE ALL CONTRACTS AT INDICATED PRICE
BIDS REJECTED BY SELLER
POSTED-BID 3
Monopoly
2 4 6 8 10Quantity
Qm
Fig. 8.
Initially in this experiment buyers independently select bids which are
then posted by the experimenter from highest to lowest. The seller then selects
a buyer (the highest bidder of course) and makes a quantity offer. The buyer
responds with an acceptance of any part of that quantity except that the
buyer is required to accept at least one unit. This specific take-it-or-leave-it
pricing process has been referred to as the Posted-Bid institution and has
been demonstrated (Plott & Smith, 1978) to operate to the advantage of
buyers. This is because the incentive of individual buyers to understate or
underreveal their demand supports buyer "cooperative" efforts to coordinate
with low bids. In view of this a question of substance is whether or not the
Posted-Bid institution might serve as a means of decentralized control over
monopoly pricing.
In Fig. 8 the first nine trading periods were under the Posted-Bid form of
discriminative auction. In periods 1 9 the bids plotted were also contract
- ..o ...... .............
Ountiy
.
Exch,ny d 47 8 77 788 77 777577777
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40prices. The seller stabilized early in the delivery of seven or eight units against
the bids tendered in each period while bid prices gradually converged toward
the competitive price $80. At the beginning of trial 10 it was announced that
henceforth the seller could no longer sell units at different prices. When the
bids were posted the seller first announced a cut-off bid price, then made
offers successively to the buyers (in order) as before, but with the under-
standing that each would pay a price equal to the lowest bid accepted (indi-
cated by the dot in periods 10-19 of Fig. 8) by the seller. As displayed in Fig. 8,
the immediate effect of this change in the bidding institution produced an
increase in the bids, and a gradual upward drift of the price level. It appears
that the bids were converging slowly to the quantity-conditional competitive
price $.90, i.e., the competitive price given that the seller was delivering seven
units per period.
5.3.LABORATORY AND FIELD STUDIES OF
SEALED-BID SECURITIES MARKETS
An earlier experimental study (Smith, 1967) of the effect of discriminative
and competitive pricing rules on bidding behavior was patterned after
procedures used, and procedures proposed, in the auctioning of U.S. Treasury
bills. In the experimental paradigm subjects bid for 18 units of a commodity
whose resale price was determined, after the bids were tendered, by a drawing
from a rectangular probability mass function whose parameters were known
to the subjects. There were two experimental treatment conditions: the
award rules and the number of bidders. Under the discriminative (D) award
treatment the highest 18 bids were accepted at the bid prices specified. Under
the competitive (C) treatment the highest 18 bids were accepted at the bid
price specified by the lowest or 18th bid. The number of subjects were 13,
15, and 17 in each of three pairs of experiments. Since each subject could
tender two bids, and the offer quantity was always 18 units, the number of
rejected or excess bids was 8, 12, and 16 in the three pairs of experiments.
Hence the study consisted of six experiments in a 2 x 3 design with two levels
for the bidding institution (D, C) and three levels for the number of rejected
bids (8, 12, 16). In each experiment up to 10 successive auctions were per-
formed to allow for learning and to study convergence under stationary
conditions. Five independent subject groups participated in the six experi-
ments. The D group with13subjects (8 rejected bids) participated in 8
auction periods, then the instructions for the C rules were introduced, and
eight more auctions were performed. Hence the group wih 8 rejected bids
participated in a DC "switchover" experiment.
Figure 9 displays the bid distributions for each paired (D, C) set of
experiments for trading periods I, 3-5. The tendency for the C bid distri-
butions to stochastically dominate the D bid distributions in the accepted
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Fig. 9. [From Bidding and auctioning institutions: Experimental results by V. L. Smith.
In Y. Ahimud (Ed.), Bidding and auctioning for procurement and allocation. New York: New
York University Press, 1976. Chart 10, p. 61. Copyright © 1976 by New York University.]
bid range is obvious. Several hypotheses were tested leading to the following
conclusions:
The variance of C bids is significantly greater than the variance of D
bids, and this discrepancy increases as the number of rejected bids increases.
The distribution of accepted C bids is significantly higher than the
distribution of accepted D bids for all rejected bid treatments. The proposi-
tion holds for all bids for C and D comparisons when there are 8 and 12, but
not 16, rejected bids.
The total receipts of the seller are greater in a C than in a D auction
for 8 and 12, but not for 16, rejected bids. This suggests that the advantage
to the seller of the C over the D bidding rules may disappear if there is a large
enough number of rejected bids.
D auctions with a larger number of rejected bids tend to stochastically
dominate D auctions with a smaller number of rejected bids. The proposition
does not hold for C auctions. This is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis
that C auctions provide incentives for demand revelation while D auctions












0.45pectations which in turn can be supposed to be affected by the volume of
rejected bids.
The total receipts of the seller are greater, the greater the number of
rejected bids in a D auction. The proposition does not hold for C auctions.
An interesting behavioral characteristic of the C auctions is observable
in Fig. 9. In every C experiment, for many auction periods,one or more
subjects entered bids equal to or greater than the highest possible resale price
in the domain of the resale distribution. Clearly, these subjectsare bidding
in excess of their marginal valuation for the item in order to bevery sure of
having their bid or bids accepted. This is a safe risk only ifno more than 17
such bids are tendered.
Belovicz (1979) has replicated and considerably extended the preceding
experimental research. Generally, his results and conclusionsare consistent
with the preceding ones, including the observation that C auction subjects
sometimes bid in excess of marginal valuation.
At least three important developments in the marketing of securities
have occurred since the above laboratory experimentswere initiated. A
modified version of the uniform-price competitive auctionwas adopted
beginning in 1964 in the French marketing of new equity issues (McDonald &
Jacquillat, 1974). Beginning in January 1973 the Treasury auctioned six
long-term bond issues using the low-bid uniform-price rule (Baker, 1976,
p. 147). Finally in November, 1976, and again in April, 1977, Exxon Corpo-
ration took the unprecedented step of bypassing the normal underwriting
institutions and marketing bond issues directly to registered broker-dealers
using the low-bid uniform-price rule (Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1977).
These developments are worthy of closer examination since they allowsome
comparisons to be made between the results of the laboratory experiments
and the results of these "experiments" with new securities marketing institu-
tions.
The French sealed-bid auction of new equity issuesappears (by one
criterion) to be a very successful institution. As of 1974 (McDonald &
Jacquillat, 1974, p. 40) no initial equity issue since 1964 had failed to receive
sufficient bids to clear the quantity offered at the minimum priceor higher.
In this auction the issuing company statesa minimum acceptable price in
advance. When the bids are tendered a committee ofcompany directors,
their bankers, and officials of the Paris Bourse examine the computer printout
of bids ranked from highest to lowest. Since orders to bid "at market"are
not admissible, the committee rejects bids above some arbitrary level as
"disguised market orders." It then allocates shares ona pro rata basis so
that the offering is exhausted at a bid price slightly below that which they
think can be sustained by free trading in the aftermarket (McDonald&
Jacquillat, 1974, pp. 41-42). The key point is thaton a typical offering many
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French investors tender bids that are obviously more than their marginal
valuations just as do their counterparts in the experimental laboratory.
Stand-out behavioral characteristics such as this provide important evidence
on parallelism (McDonald & Jacquillat, 1974, P. 39, also note this similarity
between investor and subject behavior).
In reporting on the results of the Treasury uniform-price auctions, Baker
(1976) emphasizes the difficulty of being sure that differences in auction
results are attributable to the auction form when the issues are of differing
maturities and of different sizes. Considering all this, Baker (1976, p. 150)
reports tentatively that there does appear to be some outward shift in the
demand curve and the possibility of a small cost saving to the Treasury by
pricing with the uniform-price auction.
Tsao & Vignola (1977) have written a preliminary report of their study
comparing the U.S. Treasury's auctioning often long-term bond issues under
discriminative rules, with the auctioning of six long-term issues under the
uniform-price rules. Table 2 provides some evidence on parallelism between
laboratory and field experiments by comparing the preliminary results of
Tsao & Vignola (1977) for Treasury bond auctions with the results of the
laboratory experiments reported by Smith (1967) and Belovicz (1979).
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF COMPETITIVE AND DISCRIMINATIVE
AUCTION RESULTS USING LABORATORY AND TREASURY DATA
Variance of bids same
under C and D
Mean bid same under
CandD
Mean bid independent of
volume of rejected bids
under C
Reject in favor of
VC>VD
Reject in favor of
B> BD
Cannot reject
D. Mean bid independent of Reject Cannot reject
volume of rejected bids
underD
Based on preliminary report of Tsao and Vignola (1977).
Reject in favor of V> VD
Reject in favor of Bc> BD
Reject
Test results, nondealer bids,
Test results, Treasury's 6 competitive and
Null hypothesis laboratory experiments 10 discriminative bond auctions
B. Seller revenue same underReject in favor of Reject in favor of R > R0
C and D Rc>RDin5ofl5 in 6 C auctions
paired comparisons and 10 D auctionsConclusion 1 that the variance of C bids exceeds thevariance of D bids
holds also in the Treasury bond data. Conclusion2 that the mean of
C bids exceeds the mean of D bids holds for allbids, not just the subset of
accepted bids, and for all proportions of rejected bids inthe Treasury data.
Conclusion 3 that seller receiptsare greater in C than in D auctions holds
for all proportions of rejected bids in the Treasurydata. Finally, conclusion
4 is strangely reversed in the Treasury data, i.e., C auctionswith a larger
proportion of rejected bids tend to stochasticallydominate C auctions with a
smaller proportion of rejected bids. Theproposition does not hold for D
auctions. This reversal is directly contraryto what one would expect from
the theory and suggests the need forfurther replication of the laboratory
experiments to determine if there is anything artifactualabout the original
results.
Apparently the management of Exxon Corporationis satisfied that the
uniform-price auction yields a net savingsto the corporation's financing
operations. In May 1977 Exxon guaranteeda $250 million issue of 30 year
tax exempt bonds offered by the city of Valdez, Alaska,the proceeds to be
used by Exxon Pipeline Co. This is the secondsuch offering df Exxon guar-
anteed bonds under the uniform-price auction,and the company indicated
that it may soon offer its own debt obligationsby this procedure (Wall Street
Journal, April 19, 1977,p. 31). The results of the second issue provided bid
tenders for over one billion dollars,or about four times the quantity offered,
giving a price of $985.82 per $1000 faceamount of bonds, with a coupon
rate of 5-%, to yield 5.598%. The yield equivalentof all the bids ranged from
5% to 5.88% (Rickert, 1977).
6. Choice Mechanisms for Public Goods
In this section we shall reviewone laboratory and two field experiments
designed to test or compare decentralized decision mechanismsfor public
goods.
6.1. THE AUCTION MECHANISMFOR PuBLIc GOODS
The first set of experiments to be reviewed appliesthe Auction Mechanism
(Smith, 1979) to a collective's choice of the quantityof a pure public good.
The experimental design is basedon a partial equilibrium (no income effects)
version of the mechanism. In this mechanism, letI'ç(X) be the dollar value
to i of X units of a common outcome public good thatcan be purchased
by a collective of I members ata price q. Let each i submit a two-tuple
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(b1, X.), where b, represents member i's contributionper unit of the public
good toward its purchase, and X1 is the quantity of the public good thati
proposes for collective purchase. In the experimental setting T'ç(X) is used to
induce value on X for each i. If i's utility of money is U(), andwe let u be
i's final outcome utility, then the Auction Mechanisnr-yiefds









X. for anyi. (1)
The collective's proposed quantity of the public good is definedas the mean,
X, of the individual proposals, while the collective's allocationof unit cost
to i is q - b. Collective agreement occurs if every iagrees to accept his
share of cost by bidding b=q - b and agrees to accept the group's
proposal by proposing X,=X. Otherwise none of the public good ispur-
chased and no i enjoys the potential surplus from the public good.
That the mechanism defined by (1) provides incentives for optimal col-
lective decision is shown by selecting (b1, X1) to maximize U. Maximization
requiresito choose (b1,X1) so that U()[(1/I)V(X)-(q - =0,
but also to choose b,= q - b and X=X to avoid vetoing the arrange-
ment. If U > 0, then V(X)= q - =b, and since b1 + L'b=
bk=q, summing over all members gives IV(X)=q. Hence X=
X°, where X° is the Lindahl (and Pareto) optimalquantity of the public
good.
Two comments on this mechanism refer respectivelyto its relevancy and
its behavioral interpretation:
(1)This mechanism is simplya generalization of a very common private
institution for the provision of a public good. Whenevera religious, art,
or music society attempts to obtain a new church, museum, or music hall
by canvassing its members (and, often, nonmembers) for contributions, the
society is effectively using a discrete version of the Auction Mechanism. That
is, the new facility is purchased if and only if contributions equalor exceed
the cost of the facility.
Ui(2)The Auction Mechanism has important behavioral similaritiesto
the Vickrey-Marschak Second Price auction and to the uniform-pricemulti-
unit auction. In these auctions the price paid by the buyer isdetermined
directly by the actions of other buyers. One is awardeda unit only if his
bid "beats" the first rejected bid. Similarly, in the AuctionMechanism for
public goods agent i's unit cost allocationq - b3 is determined by all
Ii. If i can and does bid high enough to accept this share of cost, then i is
able to enjoy the surplus attainable from the public good.
Twelve experiments (Smith, 1979) have been conducted usingthe mech-
anism described above (see Table 3). The experimentalprocess consisted of a
series of trials with a specified upper limit T to the number of trials allowable.
The stopping rule for determining collective agreementwas for each subject
to bid his share of cost on two successive trials (t*- 1, t'), and to accept the
group's proposal on the final "stop" trial (t*). Each trialbegan with each
subject privately choosing (br, Xj, and ended with thepublic posting of
b and X which enables each subject tocompute q - b,=q -
(>.= 1bk - bj and determine his "profit" T'(X)- (q ->b)X on that
trial.
Table 3 summarizes the results of three experimentalsessions (Al) with
I=5, five sessiOns (A2) with I=4, and four sessions (A3) with I=8. The
A3 sessions were a replication of the A2 but with two subjects ratherthan one
having the valuation functions J'(X), I=1,2, 3,4, and with the price of the
public good twice its level in A2. This permittedan examination of the effect
of doubling the size of the collective while keepingconstant the relative
structure of taste and cost. Table 3 records the Lindahi prices and quantity
for each experimental design6 and the actual final bidsand quantities for
each experimental session. Only session A3,2 failedto reach agreement for
reasons clearly attributable to incentive incompatibility (or "free riding").
Four of the sessions (A1.2, A2.1, A2.3, and A3.2)encountered coordination
problems associated with the stopping rule. That is, in thesesessions the cost
of the public good was either overbidor agreement was within one bid unit
with one or more subjects hesitant to fill in the bidgap for fear of an overbid.
(In recent experiments this problem has been solved by rebatingany overbid
to each subject in proportion to his bid and modifying theprocess to allow
the collective simply to vote at the end of each trial for whichthe cost of the
public good is covered. Agreement then requiresa unanimous vote in favor
of finalizing the outcome of that trial.)
By estimating the parameters of the regression equationb=/3 +f3p
where p, is the Lindahi price and b, the final bid for subjecti one may test









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the hypothesis that the theoretical Lindahl prices explain subject bids. The
results (Smith, 1979) yield R2 from 0.82 to 0.99across the three sets of experi-
ments, with io not significantly different from zero andnot significantly
different from unity.
These experiments provide rather encouraging evidenceto suggest that
small collectives can voluntarily provide Lindahi public good equilibria. Of
course one observes this whenever a fund drive by a private society ends
successfully, but in such nonlaboratory environmentsone does not observe
individual valuations. Hence there is noway of relating success or nonsuccess
to valuations to examine the efficiency of the mechanism.
6.2. BOHM EXPERIMENT
In a Swedish experiment (Bohm, 1972)consumers (who had volunteered
to come to a TV studio for a payment of Kr. 50)were randomly assigned to six
different groups and asked to state how much theywere willing to pay under
six different cost sharing rules to watcha particular TV program that had
not yet been shown to the public. The sixth group made hypothetical choices
while for the remaining five the program would be shown if andonly if the
aggregate of the amount offered were sufficient tocover the cost. Each group
was led to believe that there were parallel groups in other rooms whose
responses were to be merged with theirs. In this way a group, for example of
size 23 (treatment I), would find it credible that with offers of onlyseveral Kr.
each the program cost (Kr. 500) was covered. Unknownto the subjects, the
program was to be shown whatever the amount of the offer.
Among the various experimental groups the amounts eachconsumer
paid, conditional on the aggregate amount offered exceedingcost, were as
follows (the mean offer in Kr. appears in parentheses):
The amount stated (Kr. 7.61).
A percentage of the amount stated, normalizedso that cost is just
covered (Kr. 8.84).
Either the amount stated, a percentage of thisamount, Kr. 5, or
nothing, to be determined by a lottery (Kr. 7.29).
Kr. 5 (Kr. 7.73).
Nothing The costs would be paid by the broadcastingcompany,
i.e., out of general taxes (Kr. 8.78).
Nothing. The response was hypothetical (Kr. 10.19).
According to Bohm's analysis only treatment VI led to offers which
differed to any (classically) significant degree from the others. Several inter-
pretations and observations seem relevant to this experiment:
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Treatment I corresponds to the Auction Mechanism applied to an
indivisible public good. The theory discussed previously suggests that there
are strong incentives for revealing demand under this mechanism and from
our experiments we have evidence that in the context of an iterative process
this mechanism produces incentive compatible outcomes. Consequently,
notwithstanding the conventional wisdom on public goods, Bohm's treat-
ment I should not be expected to yield strong free-rider tendencies unless this
is a peculiarity of single trial responses. The theory that has maintained that
free-riding will occur in this context has not taken account of the opportunity
losses incurred by failure to cover cost.
Irrespective of these considerations, if treatment I is regarded as the
"free-rider" control experiment against which comparisons are made, then
the effect of each of the treatments II, IV, V, and VI is to raise the average
offer in what might be considered the expected direction. That is, subjects
might be expected to offer more in II than in I in the expectation that their
share of cost in II is unlikely to exceed that in I. Similarly, IV provides a
modest fixed imputation of the cost regardless of one's offer, and similarly
for V and VI.If the preexperimental hypothesis had been that these were the
directions in which the treatment outcomes would diverge, then regardless
of the significance tests by classical standards, one would have to conclude
that the experimental results increased to some degree the credibility of the
hypothesis.
The lower offers elicited under treatment III are not in accordance with
expectations based upon the above arguments. However, treatment III is
by far the most complex or ambiguous, psychologically. The lower average
offer in III is consistent with the "ambiguity hypothesis" which would assert
that where outcomes are defined by psychologically "rich" (complicated,
mysterious, uncertain) processes, subjects are more conservative, or cautious,
in their responses. This phenomenon is suggested in a somewhat different
context (Ellsberg, 1961; Sherman, 1974) but may have application in the
Bohm experiment.
Each subject was asked for a single response. Although the subjects
"accepted the question as...posed and (most)... gavetheir responses in a
matter of a minute or less (Bohm, 1972, p. 126)," the result is not likely to be
the same as would obtain if the subjects arrived at a final decision through a
process involving many response-outcome iterations.
6.3. THE PBS STATION PROGRAM COOPERATIVE
In 1974 the Public Broadcasting Service began a three-year experiment
to develop a decentralized process for the selection of programs to be broad-
cast over the noncommercial television network. Some results of the firsttwo seasons of experience with this Station Program Cooperative (SPC) have
been reported by Ferejohn & Noll (1976). Approximately 150 participating
stations made actual selections from 93programs in the first experiment and
136 in the second. The process consisted of 12 iterations (with eachstation
manager communicating through his teletypewriter) and converged rapidly
(in 7 iterations) to 25 produced programs the firstyear and (in 10 iterations)
to 38 produced programs the second year. The cost ofprogramj for stationi
on trial t was
8b1 0.2n,
- 1)+N(t -1)1'
where C1 was the producer's cost ofprogram j, b1 is the budget and n, the
population served for any station i selectingprogram j, and B,(t - 1) is the
aggregate budget and N(t - 1) the aggregate population served for allsta-
tions selecting programj on trial t- 1.
This cost sharing rule has the essential features of the AuctionMecha-
nism, i.e., (1) each manager risks forfeiting his privatenet benefit if he fails
to "vote for" a program, and (2) he has veto powerover the cost allocated to
him by the choices of all other stations. However, it has the undesirable
characteristic that stations can only acceptor reject a program at a bid
determined mechanically by the above formula. A station willingto pay
some amount for a particular program, but less than the formula allocation,
must perforce decline to select the program, while a station willingto pay
more than its formula allocation has no way of signaling this intensity by
increasing its bid. But these are obvious armchair criticisms thatmay or may
not be operationally significant. One must take seriouslya mechanism that
yields large scale allocations judged to be satisfactory by the participating
agents.
7. Conclusion
This paper has been mute in its reference to the theme of this conference
the evaluation of econometric models. This is because themessage of the
paper calls for us to start over in resource allocation theory and in the econo-
metric modeling of microeconomic phenomena. Thereis no conflict between
the scientific objectives of econometric modeling and experimental method-
ology. Indeed, it is questionable whetheror not econometrics can be given
any scientific content whatsoever in the absence of experimental data and
replication.
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The problem with any attempt to provide econometric models of market
behavior (laboratory or nonlaboratory) is that we simply do not haveany
adequate theory. Competitive price theory requires that there be sucha
large number of buyers and sellers that each effectively becomes a price
taker. Yet experimental markets with as few as 3-4 buyers and as many
sellers converge with astonishing rapidity to withina narrow range of the
supply and demand equilibrium using the double auction institution in
which every participant is a price maker not a price taker. Furthermore, these
results can be modified in experiments that alter the rules governing the
institution of contract; for example, by allowing only sellers to make quo-
tations or by requiring sellers to post take-it-or-leave-it offers. But to date
we have no theory of price formation under these alternative institutions
that lends itself to econometric modeling. Economic theorists sometimes
suggest that complete information on supply and demand is sufficient, if not
necessary, to the attainment of a competitive equilibrium. Yet, as we have
seen above, there are experimental supply and demand configurations in
which convergence to the competitive equilibrium is weakened by the state
of complete information. This suggests that economic theory seriously lacks
an adequate treatment of the role of information in price adjustment pro-
cesses.
In short, we have no theory of price adjustment processes or institutions
that is operational enough to allow an econometric modeling of experi-
mental markets. The traditional ad hoc difference-differential equation dy-
namics does not deal with process. The literature on price search theory
appears to be dealing with the appropriate ingredients of a satisfactory
theory, but as yet this work is still based on too simplistic a set of assumptions
to capture the search-learning process that seems to characterize institutions
such as the double auction.
Yet the challenge to theory unmistakable; there is a growing body of
hard laboratory results based on numerous replications and a great diversity
of price-making institutions. Furthermore, the studies by Bohm (1972) and
Ferejohn & Noll (1976) for public goods, and by Tsao & Vignola (1977) for
private goods suggest that models of laboratory behavior have direct rele-
vance to the modeling of field behavior.7 What is needed is a restructuring of
theory to capture the institutional elements in the price formation process,
whether the theory is to be tested with laboratory experiments or field data.
In this paper we argue that we ought to begin with the laboratory results
where value (cost) is induced, and hence an important extraneous source of
variability is controlled.
That is, these field studies report many results that are consistent with the results of
laboratory experiments such as those reported by Smith (1967, 1979) and Belovicz (1979).ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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